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THE SCOPE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMMUNITY
AGAINST SEARCHES AND SEIZURES*
JOHN

E. F. WOOD**

When an occasion is presented in which the officer could
secure a search warrant, his power to proceed without one
is determined by two major considerations, the degree to
which his acts will invade one's privacy, and the practicability of first procuring the issuance of a warrant. Both
these considerations turn largely upon the nature of the
place where the search is to be made, and so it may be said
that the place of the search is the controlling factor in determining the reasonableness of a search and seizure without a warrant. The Constitution affords protection to the
people "in their persons, houses, papers and effects." The
degree of protection throughout remains constant; the
amount fluctuates as the interest in privacy and the necessities of law enforcement vary.
The great citadel of privacy is the home. It is there that
the most intimate of human affairs are housed. It was intrusion into private homes which was held actionable in the
English cases which first declared the law of search and
seizure. Moreover, in our modern civilization, the home is
a fixed and permanent structure. The officer may go in
quest of a Warrant, confident that the house will await his
return. These facts make it a rare case indeed in which it
would be reasonable to search a private dwelling without
a warrant. The courts have consequently been almost
unanimous in condemning such a search. 51 7 The legislatures also have recognized the fact that the home is accorded the most complete protection. 58 It is recognized in the
Volstead Act which requires a stronger showing for the
issuance of a warrant to search a home than for the search

$ This

Is the second installment of a thesis on "The Scope of the Constitutional

Immunity Against Searches and Seizures."
The first installment appeared
December, 1927, number of the West Virginia Law Quarterly.
00 LL.B. West Virginia University, 1927, Huntington, West Virginia.
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I The cases to this effect are collected in a note, 27 A. L. R. 724.
25 Sulivitch v. People, 71 Colo. 376, 206 Pac. 789 (1919).
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of any other place. 159 The Supreme Court has in a recent
case stated very definitely its views on the subject:
"Save in certain cases as incident to arrest there is no
sanction in the decisions of the courts, federal or state,
for the search of a private dwelling house without a
warrant. * * * * And such searches are held unlawful
notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable
cause."16 0

The undesirable results of so positive a rule have already
been shown, but it will require a strong case to induce the
courts to weaken it in any way.
When it is said that a home may never be searched without a warrant, save in one instance, the problem is only
half solved. What is a home? How much of one's premises is included in the conception "home"?
There is of
course no doubt that an apartment 1'' or a suite of rooms'0 2
actually used as a dwelling place is a home. And a rude
cave dug into the side of a hill, in which the owner makes
his abode, is entitled to all the protection accorded to a
mansion. 1'
It frequently happens, however, that one's
premises are large, and include outbuildings. In such a
case, he is quick to assert that the whole is his home. It is
obvious that some line must be drawn; its precise location
is not so obvious. "Home" for this purpose does not necessarily include the entire domestic establishment, the common law messuage, 16 4 because the same interest in privacy
does not prevail throughout. It is probable that when the
actual dwelling house is passed, the absolute right ceases,
and outbuildings may be searched without a warrant on a
showing that the officer acted prudently.0 5 It has been
said that the officer may search such outbuildings without
a warrant only when he can do so without committing a
log§25 of the Volstead Act (41 STAT. AT LARSE 307) provides that search warrants
for th. violation of the Act shall be issued as provided under th. Espionage Act, except
that "no search warrant shall issue to search any private dwelling occupied as such
unless it is being used for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor, or unless it is in part
used for some business purpose."
.J Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20 (1925).
l United States v. Mitchell. 274 Fed. 128 (D. C. Calif. 1921).
l.. People v. Halveksy, 215 Mich. 136, 183 N. W. 762 (1921).
3 Morse v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 772, 265 S. W. 87 (1924).
l' As to the extent of the messuage, see Marmet Co. v. Archibald, 37 W. Va. 778,
17 S. E. 299; BouvrER's LAW DicT., 2207.
M*United States v. Murrish, 17 F. (2d) 829 (D. C. Mon., 1927) ; Dulek v. United
States, 16 F. (2d) 276 (C. C. A., 6th, 1926); State v. Magnanoo 97 Conn. 548, 117 At].
550

(1922).
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trespass. 16 6 Such a distinction introduces a false standard;
reasonableness is not to be ascertained so easily. The whole
problem is simply a perplexing question of degree. The
farther the officer goes into the outlying parts of the premises, the less the interest in privacy becomes, and the less
the requirements of reasonableness. And a recent statement of Mr. Justice Holmes seems to indicate that when a
certain line is passed, the protection of the Amendment
ceases altogether. In Hester v. United States, he said,
"The special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their 'persons, houses, papers and
effects' is not extended to the open fields. The distinction between the latter and the former is as old as the
common law."' 16 7
Somewhere between the extremes of the dwelling house on
the one side and the open fields on the other, is the place
where the officer may institute his search without a warrant. Its location depends upon all the circumstances of
the particular case.
Probably the next field in the descending scale of interest
in privacy isthat of sealed mail matter. It was early decided that the mails were under the protection of the
Fourth Amendment and could be opened only on a valid
search warrant. 168 Apparently the only exception which has
been made to this rule is in cases of letters written by inmates of a penal institution. It is considered reasonable to
intercept and examine such mail, because the measure is
necessary to the proper maintenance of prison discipline. 69
Ftm a historical 'viewpoint, the Amendment does not
properly extend its protection to the mails. It has apparently always been the law in England that the mails can be
opened at will by the proper officers, and indeed that was
one of the reasons advanced for having governmental postal service. 170 It cannot be denied, however, that the American decisions reach a very desirable result. It would be in1:,
United States v. Mathues, 17 F. (2d) 274 (D. C. Pa. 1927).
', Hester v. United States, 266 U. S. 67 (1924).
A similar doctrine has been applied
In Tritico v. United States, 4 F. (2d) 664 (C. C. A., 5th, 1926) ; Koth v. United States,
16 F. (2d) 59 (C. C. A., 9th, 1926) ; Reutlinger v. State. 234 Pac. 227 (Okla. 1925)
Findley v. State, 234 Pac. 224 (Okla. 1925).
IC Ez parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727 (1877) ; Stroud v. United States, 251 U. S. 15
(1919).
162State v. Booker, 68 W. Va. 8, 69 S. E. 295 (1910).
ITO22 Law Notes 97.
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tolerable to have the mails subject to an aimless perusal,
merely in the hope of finding something objectionable.
Offices and places of business are frequently the resting
place of implements of crime, and it becomes necessary to
invade them. Here again the officer is confronted with the
necessity for the exercise of judgment. An office, closed to
the publio in general, bears many of the attributes of the
home. It therefore requires a strong case to justify search
without a warrant.1 7' More public places, however, such
as stores, are on a different footing. There it seems the
officer may proceed with the search if he has a reasonable
suspicion, even though he would have time to procure a
w.arrant. 172 The requirement of probable cause is quite
sufficient to safeguard the interests of the individual when
so little privacy is involved.
The search of a person presents sharply conflicting considerations. The personal indignity and embarrassment of
such an act is great; and, on the other hand, to wait for a
search warrant is to permit the offender to escape. The
necessities of the case justify a search and seizure without
a warrant; the due protection of the individual requires a
rather well-founded suspicion that the search will bear
fruit. It is sometimes said that this suspicion, this probable cause, must rest upon information brought home to the
officer through his senses, and not on the information of
others. 1'7 3 This is not an inflexible rule, however, and a
search of the person may be reasonable when the suspicion
rests, in part at least, upon hearsay. 7 4 Here again the courts
are prone to rely on the rules for arrest. A search of the
person so frequently accompanies arrest, that the tendency
i; to determine first the validity of the arrest without a
warrant, and then to justify the search as incidental to the
arrest. 75 That makes the question of reasonableness turn
' Silverthorne Lumber Co.
v. United States, 251 U. S. 885 (1920) ; Ardop v.
United States, 255 U. S. 313 (1921); Gouled v. United States, 256 U. S. 298 (1911)
Fidelity Co. v. State, 121 Miss. 369, 83 So. 610 (1919).
172Kathriner v. United States, 276 Fed. 808 (C. C. A., 9th, 1921) ; Dillon v. United
States, 279 Fed. 639 (C. C. A., 2nd, 1921) ; O'Connor v. United States, 281 Fed. 896
(D. C. N. J. 1922) ; Billingsley v. United States, 16 F. (2d) 754 (C. C. A.. 8th, 1926) :
Hess v. State, 192 Ind. 50, 133 X. E. 880 (1922); State v. Llewellyn, 119 Wash. 800,

205 Pac. 394 (1922) ; People v. Chomis, 223 Mich. 289, 193 N. W. 796 (1928).

173Agnello v. United States, 290 Fed. 671 (C. C. A., 2d., 1923), reversed on another
ground, 269 U. S. 20 (1925).
" White v. United States, 16 F. (2d) 870 (C. C. A., 9th, 1926) ; State v. Mullen,
68 Mont. 50, 207 Pac. 634 (1922).
17 State v. Koil, 136 S. E. 510 (W. Va." 1927) ; State v. Phillips, 105 Oh. St. 641.
183 N. E 55 (1922).
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upon the distinction between felonies and misdemeanos,
which is not an accurate method. Closely allied to search
of the person is the search of grips and other luggage. It
apparently rests upon the same basis. 176
The proper enforcement of the prohibition laws has required rather extensive efforts to interrupt the transportation of intoxicating liquors. This means that vehicles must
be stopped and examined, and has presented the question
as to the requisites of a lawful search in such an instance.
The automobile is so far removed from the home in the
degree of privacy involved, and its ready mobility makes
delay so disastrous, that some courts have been inclined to
deny that it is protected at all by the Fourth Amendment.
As one court facetiously said,
"The sacred attributes of the home or private premises
have not yet been authoritatively ascribed to the automobile. No court has so far said that a man's touring
car is his castle." 177
The disagreeable incidents of a search and seizure are
nevertheless present when its scene is a vehicle, to a lesser
degree than in some other situations, but still sufficiently to
justify the exaction of reasonableness from the officers. The
victims go still further and contend that they should be allowed to escape while the officer is securing a warrant.
The problem thereby presented to the courts has thus been
analyzed by one of the state tribunals.
"While a possession in the sense of private ownership,
they (automobiles) are but a vehicle constructed for
transportation and travel on highways. Their active use
is not in homes or on private premises, the privacy of
which the law especially guards from search and seizure
without process. The baffling extent to whict4 they are
successfully utilized to facilitate commission of crime *
* * * is a matter of common knowledge. Upon that problem, a condition and not a theory confronts proper administration of our criminal laws. Whether search of
and seizure from an automobile upon a highway or other
public place without a search warrant is unreasonable is
in its final analysis to be determined as a judicial quesITO

People v. Foreman, 218 Mich. 591, 188 N. W.

375

(1922) ; Blacksburg v. Beam,

104 S. C. 146, 88 S. E. 441 (1916); State v. Simmons, 183 N. C. 684, 110 S. E. 591
(1922).
ITTPeople v. Chyc, 219 Mich. 273, 189 N. W. 79

(1922).
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tion in 7view
of all the circumstances under which it is
8
made."
It was not until rather recently that the problem was presented to the Supreme Court in such a way as to require
a careful consideration of the whole subject. Carroll v. United
States179 was a case Where officers without a warrant had
stopped and searched an automobile, and seized liquor
found therein. The car itself was not suspicious in appearance; the officers had no indication from their senses that it
contained liquor. Their suspicion was based solely upon
the fact that some months previously the owner of the car
had negotiated with them for the sale of liquor. The question presented was whether, upon these facts, the search
and seizure was reasonable. The Court pointed out that
from the beginnings of our government the Congress has
recognized distinctions between the search of homes and
that of movable vehicles. It repudiated the idea that such
vehicles were not entitled to' the protection of the Amendment, but held that such a search was reasonable on facts
which might not justify the search of other places. As to
the elements going to make up probable cause, the Court
said,
"If the facts and circumstances before the officer are
such as to warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that the offense has been committed, it is sufficient."
Such a standard is quite sufficient to protect adequately the
interest in privacy, and at the same time does not put insuperable obstacles in the way of efficient law enforcement.
It has the further advantage of being flexible, so that restilts may be reached to fit the individual case, without regard to finely spun distinctions which have little or nothing
to do with reasonableness or unreasonableness.
There is yet one other factor to be considered in looking
to the lawfulness of a search and seizure, whether with or
without a warrant. The existence of a valid search warrant, or the existence of such cause as will, in the particular instance, justify a search without a warrant, authorizes
the officer to commence the search. It is in its inception
"'

People v. Case, 220 Mich. 379, 190 N. W. 289 (1922).

170 267 U. S. 132 (1924).
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lawful. Whether it remains so depends upon the officer.
The constitutions require of him moderation and judgment
in the execution of the search and seizure, and his failure
to exercise these qualities renders the whole procedure unlawful, no matter how proper it was in the beginning. This
element of reasonableness depends to a certain extent upon
the time of the search, but largely upon its manner and extent.
In the earliest days of search warrants, the opinion apparently prevailed that they could be executed only in the
daytime. 180 The reason for such a requirement is obvious.
People have always had an innate feeling that the right of
privacy becomes more absolute as night falls. It is also undoubtedly true that the invasion of private premises is more
dangerous when made under cover of darkness. This historical attitude is illustrated in the rules of the common law
as to the crime of burglary, 181 and certain statutory dis8 2 Hale
tinctions as to arson.1
suggested that all search warrants ought to require on their face that they be executed
in the day time, and concluded,
" * * * and though they may not be unlawful without

such restriction, yet they are very inconvenient without
it, for many times under pretense of searches made in the
night, robberies and burglaries have been
committed, and
at best it creates great disturbance.' 183
The modern law in England apparently is that in the absence
of statutes to the contrary, a search and seizure must be
made in the daytime. In the United States, the situation is
reversed: in the absence of statutes requiring execution in
the daytime, they may be made either in the day or night.
As has been shown, the federal statutes require that the
search be in the daytime except in cases where the outcome
of the search is not in doubt, whereas the West Virginia
law is that the search may be either in the day or night.
Although this matter is not looked upon as of so much importance as formerly, it is conceivable that even under a
statute so broad as that in West Virginia, a search would
be unreasonable when it could as well have been made in
"~
',:

Espinasse. NIsi Prius, vol. I, p. 881.
BISHOP. CRIMINAL LAW, vol. II, §90.

l' W. VA. OODE, c. 145, §§1, 2.
'.S HALE, P. 0., voL II. p. 150.
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the daytime, and is for no good reason postponed until
nightfall.
Another matter relating to the time of the search, particularly under a search warrant, is the length of time which
has elapsed between the complaint and the execution of
the search. The statutes of some jurisdictions provide that
a search warrant shall become void if not executed within
a certain time after its issuance. 18 4 In the absence of such
a statute, it ha- been held that a search and seizure under
a stale warrant is unreasonable. 1 5 No definite time can be
set as the standard; it must be .determined by looking to all
the facts and circumstances, and a delay which is justified
by the necessities of the case is quite lawful. 18
To be reasonable, a search and seizure must be effected
in such a way as to cause the least possible inconvenience
and damage to the victims. No search warrant can legalize
the unnecessary and wanton destruction of property. An
extreme case illustrating this principle has arisen in the
state of Maine. Officers armed with a valid search warrant
went to a house and searched it thoroughly. The property
thought to be concealed was not discovered, and the officers
sent for picks and crowbars, with which they tore out walls
and practically wrecked the interior of the house. It is unnecessary to add that the court held the search unlawful. 18 7
So where the officers having a valid search warrant, forced
open a safe in the absence of the owner, the search was
held unreasonable, the court saying that they should have
awaited his return so that it could be opened without destroying it.188 Not only must the officers be circumspect in
their methods, but they must be discreet as to the extent of
their investigations. The fact that a warrant authorizes
the search of a certain room does not empower the officers
to search everybody found there, regardless of possible connection with the matter under investigation. 18 9 The fact
"I There is such a provision as to search warrants issued under federal statutes.
40 STAT. AT LARGE 229.
1WElrod v. Moss, 278 Fed. 128 (C. C. A., 4th, 1921) ; Link v. Commonwealth. 199
Ky. 778, 261 S. W. 1016 (1923); State v. Guthrle, 90 Me. 448, 88 AtU. 368 (1897);
Farmer v. Sellers, 89 S. C. 492, 72 S. E. 224 (1911) ; State v. Pachesa, 185 S. E. 908
(W. Va. 1926).
State v. John, 186 S. E. 842 (W. Va. 1926).
21 Buckley v. Beaulieu, 104 Me. 66. 71 At]. 70 (1908).
183 Blackmar v. Nickerson, 188 Mass. 899, 74 N. E. 932 (1985).
139Purkey v. Mabey, 88 Idaho 281, 193 Pac. 79 (1920) ; State v. Massie, 95 W. Va.
213, 120 S. E. 614 (1923).
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that an officer has probable cause to search one house does
not justify him in searching one a slight distance away in
the faint hope of finding further evidence of crime. 190 The
officer must search the places which his warrant or his
probable cause justifies, as quickly and carefully as possible, and then leave. He cannot remain on the premises. 191
Nor can he return to the premises without a showing of additional cause. 10 2 The essence of these requirements is
simply that the officers of the law be gentlemen. No other
course of conduct is reasonable.
Here again the scene of the search may be of importance.
Just as the degree of intensity of the interest in privacy controls in a large measure the right to search without a warrant, it may have a bearing on the extent to which the
search may reasonably be carried. This idea has been stated
by Judge Hand in a recent federal case,
"While we agree that strict consistency might give to
a search of,the premises, incidental to arrest, the same
scope as to a search of the person, it seems to us that
that result would admit exactly the evils against which
the Fourth Amendment is directed. Whatever the casuistry of border cases, it is broadly a totally different
thing to search a man's pockets and use against him what
they may contain, from ransacking his house for everything which may incriminate him, once you have gained
lawful entry, 93either by means of a search warrant or by
his consent.'
The cases have not worked out this principle very clearly,
but it seems altogether proper to let the nature of the search
itself be governed by the degree to which it will invade
privacy, as well as the lawfulness of undertaking the search
without the sanction of legal process, so that an officer on
a search of an automobile might go to greater lengths than
he could at the home of the accused.
The constitutions provide no remedies for the violation
of,the rights which they secure. They have been supplied,
partly by the legislatures, but largely by the courts. Even
though not strictly a part of the constitutional provisions,
10 Agnello v. United States. supra, n. 160. For a doubtful extension of this principle,
see State v. Adams, 136 S. E. 703 (W. Va. 1927).
101Levin v. Blair, 17 F. (2d) 151 (D. C. Pa. 1927).
102 Gamble v. Keyes, 35 S. D. 644, 153 N. W. 888 (1915).
103 United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F. (2d)
202 (C. C. A., 2d., 1926).
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the means of redress available to a person whose privacy
has been invaded in an unlawful way is a most important
element in this study, for without a remedy, the right would
be idle.
One question which perhaps belongs more properly in a
discussion of the rights secured, but which has for reasons
of convenience been classed as a topic under remedies, is as
to who may complain of a wrongful search and seizure. As
the interests involved are those of the individual, the .protection accorded is peculiarly personal. One cannot object
vicariously to a violation of the Fourth Amendment. The
person whose premises were invaded and whose property
was seized is the proper one to complain, even though the
more direct injury be to another.194 This doctrine has been
carried so far as to refuse the protection of the Amendment
to the individual members of an unincorporated association
95
when the property seized was that of the association.
This holding may outrage principles of partnership law,
but it shows clearly the personal nature of the rights secured. In applying this principle, the courts have apparently made the ownership of the property the criterion,
without regard to possession. So where employees of the
owner of premises were operating the owner's still, so as to
be in unlaw~ful "possession" of a moonshine still, they
could not object to an unlawful search for and seizure of
the property;196 and where an individual was in possession
of public documents, he could not complain of an unreasonable search for them. 197 It may be that the right -of
privacy ought not to be wholly dependent upon ownership,
19 8
but the most of the cases clearly make such a test.
It is commonly said that as a necessary corollary of the
personal nature of the interests secured, the right is one
which may be waived 90 So when the accused actually in124 Moy v. Prentis, 234 Fed. 24 (C.
C. A., 7th, 1916); Tsule w. Backus, 243 ]red.
551 (C. C. A., 9th, 1917) ; Remus v. United States, 291 Fed. 601 (C. C. A., 6th. 1928) ;
Brooks v. United States, 8 F. (2d) 598 (C. C. A., 9th, 1926) ; Whitaker V. Commonwealth, 197 Ky. 283, 246 S. W. 825 (1923).
29 Haywood v. United States, 268 Fed. 796 (C. C. A., 7th, 1920).
The same result
was obtained where the property was that of a corporation. Guckenheim v. United
States, 3 F. (2d) 786 (C. C. A., 3d, 1925).
20 United States v. Mandel, 17 F. (2d) 270 (D. C. Mass. 1927).
,17 Dreier v. United States, 221 U. S. 394 (1911) ; People v. Coombs, 168 N. Y. 582,
5I N. E. 527 (1899).

in CORNELIUS, SEARCU AND SEIZURE, §12.
"s The cases are collected
McClurg v. Brenton, 123 Iowa 368, 98 N. W. 881 (1904) ; CORNEIUS,
i
AND SEIZURE, §16.
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vites or freely acquiesces in the search, he cannot be heard
to complain. 200 IVere submission to apparent authority is
not sufficient; it must appear that the victim knew of his
rights and voluntarily laid them aside. 201 It frequently happens that the alleged waiver is made by someone acting
for the owner. In such case, it must appear that the person
assenting had authorityi to do so,2 02 and that there was no
coercion. 203 In a sense, the use of the term "waiver" in
such cases may be technically inaccurate. The right involved is to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures; a search which is made by invitation or consent is not
unreasonable, and therefore there is no right to be waived.
The difference is of course simply in the manner of speaking, and has no bearing on the result reached. Acts which
in the one sense would constitute a waiver would in the
other sense be circumstances making the search reasonable.
Assuming that there has been an invasion of, the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures, and has been no waiver, the proper party has a
variety of remedies. If the person who procured the issuance of the warrant acted in bad faith, there is of course an
action for malicious prosecution or abuse of process. 20 4 And
even though he acted in good faith, it has been said that he
is justified or not by the event. If the search reveal nothing,
he is liable. 20 5 It is submitted that these decisions are unsound, for they give an action for damages to one even
though the search be lawful. It is well settled that the
20 6
legality of a search does not depend upon what is found.
The reasonableness -of procuring the issuance of a search
warrant should rather depend upon probable cause, and
:14 Massie v. United States, 295 Fed. 683 (C.
Idfurrish, 17 F. (2d) 831 (D. C. Mont.
117 S. E. 870 (1923) ; State v. Lough,
Brown, 101 W. ya. 160, 132 S. B. 366
201 Brain v. United States. '168 U.

84 So. 227 (1920).
1924).

C. A., 4th, 1924); United States v.

1927) ; State v. Montgomery, 94 W. Va. 153,
97 W. Va. 241, 124 S. E. 606 (1924) ; State v.
(1926).
S. 532 (1897) ; Banfill v. Byrd, 122 Miss. 288,

See however, Massie v. United States, 295 Fed. 683 (C. C. A., 4th,

wAWeeks v. United States, 282 U.

S. 383 (1913) ; Amos v. United States, 255 U, S.

313 (1921) ; State a. Griswold, 67 Conn. 290, 34 Atl. 1046 (1896) ; Smith v. McDuffee,
72 Oregon 276, 142 Pac. 336 (1925).
A Gouled v. United States, supra, n. 171.

2' Hardin v. Hight, 106 Ark. 190, 153 S. W. 99 (1913) ; Gulsby v. Railway Co.. 167
Ala. 122, 52 So. 392 (1910) ; Page v. Banking Co., 111 Ga. 73, 36 S. E. 418 (1900)*
Olsen v. Tvete, 46 Minn. 226, 48 N. W. 914 (1891) ; Boeger v. Langenburg, 97 Mo. 390,
11 S. W. 223 (1889).
"I Reed v. Legg, 2 Har. (Del.) 173 (1837) ; Fennemore v. Armstrong, 6 Boyce
(Del.) 35, 96 Atl. 204 (1915) ; HALE, P. C., voL II, p. 150; Espinasse, Nisi Prius,
vol. I, p. 381.
20 People a. Marxhausen, 204 Mich. 569, 171 N. W. 557 (1919) ; People v. Jakira,
193 N. Y. S. 305 (1922) ; State v. Jokost, 181 Wis. 160, 193 N. W. 976 (1923).
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unless the findings of the magistrate on that question be
upset, the informer has done no wrong. The person making
the complaint has also been held liable to respond in damages to the person subjected to a search and seizure even
though the unlawfulness be injected by another, as where
the magistrate failed to follow statutory requirements in
the wording of the warrant, 207 or where the officer made his
20
operations too extensive.
Where the search warrant is illegal on its face, both the
magistrate who issued it and the officer who executed it are
liable in damages. 20 9 If, however, it was apparently legal,
the fact that it contains latent invalidities will not render
the officer executing it liable. 210 An officer who makes an
unreasonable search without a warrant is responsible in
damages ;211 and even though the search be lawful in its inception, the officer becomes a trespasser ab initio if he
abuses his powers. 212 Private persons assisting an officer
are protected by his command; but they are liable for a
wrongful search if they are volunteers. 218 The English
courts allow exemplary damages in such cases ;214 the decisions of the States are not uniform, some of them allowing
2 15
only compensation.
It is practically impossible to obtain damages from the
government in question. Municipal corporations are not
liable for the wrongs of their officers in this connection because search and seizure is a governmental function. 210 The
states and the federal government are not suable because
217
they have in general failed to consent to such actions.
If the facts are such as to make it practicable, the accused may obtain an injunction against a proposed wrong207Halstead

v. Brice, 18 Mo. 171 (1850).
202 Larthet v. Forgay, 2 La. Ann. 524, 46 Am. Dec. 554

(1847).

204Dwinnels v. Boynton, 8 Allen (Mass.) 310 (1862).
210Kalloch v. Newbert, 105 Me. 23, 72 Atl. 78G (1908) ; O'Meara v. Merritt, 128
Mdich. 249, 87 N. W. 197 (1901).
11 Caffinni iv. Hermann, 112 Maine 282, 91 Atl. 100W (1914).
212 Six Carpenters Case, 8 Coke 146, 77 Eng. Rep. 696 (1610) ; Lawton v. Cardell
22 Vt. 624 (1850). In McGuire v. United States, 278 U. S. 95 (1927), the Court refused to apply this doctrine in dealing with the admissibility of evidence.
"I5Reed v. Rice, 2 J. J. Marsh (Ky.) 44, 19 Am. Dec. 122 (1829).
214
215

Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. K. B. 205, 95 Eng. Rep. 769

(1768).

Fennemore v. Armstrong, 6 Boyce (Del.) 85, 96 AtI. 204 (1915) ; Larthet v.
Forgay, 2 La. Ann. 524 (1847) ; McClurg v. Brenton, 123 Iowa 868, 98 N. W. 881 (1904)
Jones v. Fletcher, 41 Me. 254 (1856); Cloon v. Gerry, 18 Gray (Mass.) 201 (1859)
Small v. McGovern, 117 Wis. 608, 94 N. W. 651 (1908).
210Harman v. Lynchburg, 33 Gratt. (Va.) 37 (1880) ; DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATONS, §1656.
"I Cummings v. United States, 180
houns, 2 H. & M. (Va.) 218 (1808).

U.

S.

459

(1888) ;
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ful search 218 or against the wrongful destruction of the
219
property seized.
Trover cannot be maintained for the wrongful seizure of
property, because there has been no conversion. 220 In rare
cases, there may be specific recovery by replevin, or an action in the nature of replevin. 221 But if a criminal charge is
pending in which the property may be used as evidence, it
222
is deemed to be in custodia legis, and cannot be replevied.
The Volstead Act provides that goods seized thereunder
shall not be subject to replevin. 22
Only a bare enumeration of these remedies has been undertaken, because they are of comparatively little importance today. The really vital question of remedy, and one
of the most widely discussed problems in the whole law of
search and seizure, is that relating to the admissibility in
evidence of property taken in violation of the accused's constitutional rights.
One of the well established rules of evidence is that in
general the method by which the evidence was obtained
does not affect its admissibility. The reason assigned for
the rule is that the court will not pause in the trial of a case
to determine a collateral issue. 22a This rule was generally
applied to property obtained by an unlawful search and
seizure, 224 until the decision of Boyd v. United States.225 In
that case, the Supreme Court, seeing an intimate relation
between the immunity from unreasonable searches, and the
provisions against self-incrimination, held that evidence
was not admissible when obtained in violation of the Fourth
226
Amendment. The rule remained thus in the federal courts
until 1904. In that year, the Supreme Court reverted to the
orthodox doctrine of the earlier cases. 227 This view prevailed for ten years; then arose the case of Weeks v. United
States. 28 In that case, the defendant did not wait until the
:18 Devlin v. McAdoo, 49 Misc. 57, 96 N. Y. S. 425.
10 Owens v. Way, 141 Ga. 796, 82 S. E. 132 (1914).
Buller, Nisi Prius, p. 45.
't
Lawton v. Steele, 153 U. S. 133 (1893) ; Soper v. Michael, 123 Md. 842, 91 Atl.
084 (1914).
2
Goode v. Police Com'rs., 137 Md. 192, 112 Atl. 294 (1920) ; Azparren v. Ferrel,
44 Nev. 157, 191 Pac. 571 (1920).
.8 41 STAT. AT LARGO 305, §25.
=2 WxaMORE, EVIDENCE, vol IV, §2183.
"I Commonwealth v. Dana, 2 Mete. (Mass.) 329 (1841).
220 116 U. S. 616 (1886).
as WIGMORE, op. Cit., vol. IV, §2184.
Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 685 (1904).
2a

232 U. S. 383 (1914).
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trial to interpose his objection, but moved beforehand that his
property be returned. The Court distinguished the Adams
case by saying that the issue here was presented before the
trial, and therefore was not collateral. The effect of this
distinction has been considerably weakened by subsequent
cases.

In Gouled v. United States,229 the defendant did not

know of the wrongful seizure until the property was offered
in evidence. His objection at that time was not too late. In
the same year, in Amos v. United States, the objection and
petition for return were interposed after the jury was empanelled and before the taking of testimony had begun, and
was timely enough to exclude the evidence. 221a The most recent

Supreme Court case on the subject is Agnello v. United
States.210 There the objection was not made until the actual
offer of the evidence, and it was held timely, the Court saying that as the facts as to the illegality of the search and
seizure were not in dispute there was no necessity for a
preliminary motion. A recent decision of a lower federal
court completes the breakdown of the requirement that
the issue be raised before trial. It holds that even though
the evidence obtained in an unlawful search and seizure be
admitted without objection, the defendant may demand a
peremptory instruction to acquit on the ground of the incompetency of the evidence against him.2 1 In view of the
trend of these decisions, it is probably not going too far to
say that the federal rule will exclude such evidence irrespective of the time when the objection is first raised.
The influence of the United States courts has led fifteen
of the State courts to adopt the federal rule,2 2 and there

are dicta in two other states that indicate a leaning toward
iL 2 3 On the other hand, a number of, the states have un-9 255 U. S. 298 (1921).
255 U. S. 313 (1921).
25 269 U. S. 20 (1926).
s Holmes v. United States, 275 Fed. 49 (C. C. A.. 4th, 1921).
'
Youman v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 152, 224 S. W. 860 (1920) ; People v. Castree,
2225

311 Ill. 892, 143 N. E. 112 (1924) ; Batts v. State, 194 Ind. 609, 144 N. E. 23 (1924) ;
People v. Marxhausen, 204 Mich. 550, 171 N. W. 557 (1919) ; Tucker v. State. 128
Bliss. 211. 90 So.. 845 (1922); State v. Owens, 302 Mo. 348, 259 S. 'V. 100 (1924)
State v. Thebodeau, 70 Mont. 202, 224 Pac. 866 (1924); Foster v. State, 226 Pac. 602
(Okla. Cr. 1924); State v. Laundy. 103 Ore. 443, 204 Pac4 958 (1922) ; Hughes v.

State, 145 Tenn. 644, 238 S. W. 688 (1922) ; State v. Slamon, 73 Vt. 212, 60 Atl. 1007
(1901) : State v. Gibbons, 118 Wash. 171, 203 Pae. 390 (1922) ; State v. Wills. 91 W. Va.
659, 114 S. E. 261 (1922) ; Novak v. State, 185 Wis. 616, 202 N. W. 336 (1925) : State
v. Peterson, 27 Wyo. 185, 194 Paec. 342 (1920).
2n Atz V. Andrews, 84 Fla. 43, 94 So. 329 (1922); State v. Myers, 36 Idaho 390,
211 Pac. 440 (1922).
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equivocally rejected the exclusion doctrine.2 4

rule was imposed by statute in Texas;

23 5

151

The federal

and a statute of

Mississippi abrogating that rule was held unconstitutional. 236 In such a situation, it is idle to undertake to declare
a weight of authority.
The great champion of the earlier rule, admitting
such evidence, is Dean Wigmore. In caustic language he
brands the doctrine of the exclusionists as based in its inception on erroneous history, and in its renaissance on misguided sentimentality. 237 He contends that the issue presented by an objection to evidence or a motion for the return of property is collateral in the true sense of the word

whenever it is raised; that the trial of such a collateral issue is an indirect enforcement of constitutional rights, when

there are direct remedies available.

The burden of his

argument is summed up in this classical satire:
"Titus, you have been found guilty of conducting a
lottery; Flavius, you have confessedly violated the Constitution. Titus ought to suffer imprisonment for crime,
and Flavius for contempt. But no! We shall let you
both go free. We shall not punish Flavius directly, but
shall do so by reversing Titus' conviction. That is our
way of teaching people like Flavius to behave, and of
teaching people like Titus to behave, and incidentally of
securing respect for the Constitution. Our way of upholding the Constitution is not to strike at the man who

breaks it, but to let off somebody else who broke some-

' 8
thing else."2

It has been suggested that the learned commentator has
omitted a character from his dramatis personae, to-wit, Ray

Spublica. Titus' quarrel is not with Flavius; it is with his
234 Banks v. State, 207 Ala. 179, 93 So. 293 (1921) ; Benson v. State, 149 Ark. 6383,
233 S. W. 758 (1921) ; People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237, 205 Pac. 435 (1922) ; Massantonio
v. People, 77 Col. 392, 236 Pac. 1019 (1925) ; State v. Reynolds, 101 Conn. 224, 125 At.
636 (1924) ; Kennemer v. State, 164 Ga. 139, 113 S. E. 551 (1922) ; State v. Rowley, 197
Iowa 977, 195 N. W. 881 (1923) ; State v. Van Wormer, 103 Kans. 309, 173 Pac. 1076
(1918) ; State v. Fleckinger, 152 La. 337, 93 So. 115 (1922) ; Commonwealth V. Wilkins,
243 Mass. 356, 138 N. E. 11 (1923) ; Billings v. State, 109 Neb. 696, 191 N. W. 721
(1923) ; State v. Agalos, 79 N. H. 241, 107 Ati. 314 (1914) ; State v. Lyons, 99 N. J. L.
301. 122 At]. 758 (1923) ; People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 160 N. E. 685 (1926) ; State
v. Simmons, 183 N. C. 684, 110 S. E. 691 (1922) ; State v. Fahn, 205 N. W. 67 (N. D.
1925) ; State v. Prescott, 125 S. C. 22, 117 S. E. 637 (1923) ; State v. Madison, 23 S. D.
684, 122 N. W. 647 (1909) ; Welchek v. State, 93 Tex. Cr. App. 271, 247 S. W. 524
(1923) ; State v. Aime, 62 Utah 476, 220 Pac. 704 (1923) ; Hall v. Commonwealth, 138
Va. 727, 121 S. E. 154 (1924).
2W

TEx. LAWS, 1925, c. 149.

2" Orick v. State, 140 Miss. 184, 105 So. 465 (1925).
=T WIGMOE, EVIDENCE, voL IV, §§ 2183, 2184.
's This passage occurs in WiGMorE, EVIDENCE, Vol. IV,
BAn AssN., vol. VIII, p. 479.

§2184,
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master, upon whom the Fourth Amendment weighs heavily. The conduct of Ray is characterized as being in literal
obedience to Biblical injunctions, "for his right hand, enthusiastically waving aloft the Constitution, knoweth not
that his left hand is just as enthusiastically offering evidence which was seized in violation of that sacred instruiment." 239
Another ground proposed in support of the admissionist
doctrine is that the wrong, the invasion of. privacy, is already done, and the exclusion of the evidence gained thereby will not restore the victim to his former condition. 240 In
answer to that proposition it is said that the same argument
applies to any remedy for the wrong done; damages against
the offender, or his imprisonment, will not put the party
where he was.241
The admission of such evidence has been justified by an
intensely logical deduction somewhat as follows: the constitutional provisions are directed only at governmental
action; when an officer forgets the law and proceeds unreasonably, he exceeds his authority, and therefore ceases
to act for the government; his wrong is therefore done in a
24 2
private capacity, and is not a violation of the Constitution.
Unless there is a fault somewhere in that reasoning, it is
quite impossible to have a violation of the Fourth Amendment, for its force is to render all unreasonable searches
and seizures dtra vires, and hence mere private tres243
passes.
Still another argument advanced is one of utility. It is
said that the result of the federal rule has been to lead the
courts following it into evasions of the law of search and
seizure in order to establish exceptions by which the evidence may be admitted. 244 It may be said in answer that
if there is to be a liberalizing trend in the law, it ought to
take the form of adjustment of rights rather than a restric't

18 ILn. L. RKV. 832.
11 People v. Mayen, 188 Calif. 237, 205 Pa.

llav. 165.

485 (1922),

discussed In 10 CAL. L.

3a Youman v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 152, 224 S. W. 860 (1920).
2"Williams v. State, 100 Ga. 511. 28 S. E. 624 (1897) ; Hall v. Commonwealth, 188
Va. 727. 121 S. E. 164 (1924).
I" State v. Owens, 302 Mo. 348, 259 S. W. 100 (1924).
31136 YALz L. J. 536.
The author points out that since the early months of
1920, 700 eases involving the admissibility of evidence taken by search and seizure have
been decided in the federal courts, and that in 290 of those cases the evidence was admitted, upon some exception,
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tion of remedies, and that the tendency of the federal
courts is quite salutary.
And so the discussion advances, with learned men differing diametrically as to the proper conclusion. 245 A question so fundamental as this should not be decided on technical grounds. Even the venerable stare decisis is poor justification for admitting the evidence simply because the
law formerly was to that effect. It may well be that the
orthodox rule is sound in so far as it applies to every-day
illegality, but it is not properly to be invoked in the face of
unconstitutionality. 246 On the one hand, it must be admitted
that an action for damages or the imprisonment of the offending officer is not an adequate remedy. Such persons
are often financially irresponsible, and are therefore not
worth-while defendants; and imprisonment of the officer is
but poor compensation to a person who may be in an adjoining cell. It is common knowledge that these remedies
are spurned every day. On the other hand, it cannot be
denied that the federal rule imposes serious obstacles in the
way of law enforcement, and leads to the undesirable result of. allowing both offenders to go free. The proper adjustment of.these conflicting considerations, is a nice problem. The method -of approach is well illustrated in a passage from an opinion by Judge Cardozo, in a case holding
the evidence admissible,
"Other sanctions, penal and disciplinary, supplementing the right to damages, have already been enumerated.
No doubt the protection of the statute247 would be greater from the point of view of the individual whose privacy
would be invaded if. the government were required to ignore what it had learned through the invasion. The question is whether protection for the individual would not
be gained at a disproportionate loss of protection for society. On the one side is the social need that crime shall
be repressed. On the other, the social need that law shall
2t3 Among the commentators following Wigmore are, Harno, "Evidence Obtained
by Illegal Search and Seizure," 19 ILL. L. REv. 303; Knox, "Self-Incrimination," 74
PENN . L. REV. 139; Fraenkel, "Concerning Searches and Seizures," 35 HARM. L. REV.
673, On the other side are, Chafee, "The Progress of the Law," 35 HAIv. L. REV. 673;
Atkinson, "Unreasonable Searches and Seizures," 25 Cox. L. REv. 11.
240 The United States Supreme Court clings to the orthodox rule that wrongfully
obtained evidence is admissible, when the wrong stops short of a violation of the Constitution. Burdeau v. IcDowell, 256 U. S. 465 (1920), Holmes and Brandeis dissenting.
21TThe New York provision as to searches and seizures in the Civil Rights Law,
rather than in the Constitution.
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not be flouted by the
'248insolence of office. There are dangers in any choice.
The wisdom in the attitude of this learned judge renders it
difficult to disagree with his conclusion; but it is not to be
wondered at that the courts are in conflict on such a question.
Were Lord Chatham in some miraculous way to return
to his earthly state, and direct his attention toward the law
of search and seizure as it has developed in America, he
would doubtless be amazed. On every side officers of the
law are going to lengths which enforcement methods of
his day would not justify, even before the decision of
Entick v. Carrington. Perhaps his esteem of the American
Constitution would not be enhanced when he learned that
the security of the individual is more absolute in England,
where fundamental rights are not embodied in a written
constitution, than in the United States, where there are f ormal guarantees against oppressive searches and seizures. 28
0
And he would not be without sympathizers. 25
If it was the intention of the first Congress to petrify the
common law rules as to searches and seizures, then we must
admit that the courts and legislatures have done violence to
that intention. If on the other hand it was their aim to
declare the policy upon which that law was based, leaving
its particular application to the wisdom of successive tribunals, then their intention has been effectuated in its integrity. There can be little doubt that the latter is the true
purpose of the Fourth Amendment. Paradoxical as it may
seem, the very fact that the people insisted upon a formal
assurance of their immunity from unreasonable searches
and seizures has made it less difficult to adjust the law to
modern needs than it would have been had the subject been
left to the slow evolution of the common law.
Another result of the flexibility of the standard set in the
Fourth Amendment has been that it is difficult of uniform
application. One cannot read the mass of cases on search
"

People v. Defore, 242 N.

Y. 18, 150 X.

E. 685 (1926).

2" The law in England apparently still is to the effect that there can be no search
ar.d seizure without a warrant; and in a number of other respects It
Ours. See HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENMLAND, Vol. IX, §§ 624, 625.
2W Youman v. Commonwealth, eupra, n. 241.
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and seizure without being impressed with what is apparently a hopeless confusion. This disagreement among the
courts is likely to be blamed, "as if it meant that one side
or the other were not doing their sums right, and, if they
would take more trouble, agreement inevitably would
come."125' The trouble is that judicial mathematics, particularly in the field of constitutional law, does not deal
with absolute quantities. Every element in the particular
problem is a variable. When courts and judges differ as
to whether a given search and seizure is reasonable, it does
not necessarily mean that one side or the other has made
an error. It simply means that somewhere in the process,
the relative weight to be assigned to some consideration
has been differently determined. The resulting uncertainties in the law are perhaps undesirable if the present litigation alone is considered; they are quite necessary if the
Constitution is to be abidingly efficient.
The law of search and seizure has not settled down, and
so long as we remain true to our constitutions, it will never
settle down. Until our present system of government falls,
the courts will constantly be faced with the old problems.
Their point of departure in deciding them will be, not where
former courts have left off, but where they began. In this
endless process of saving to the individual the most complete protection that is consonant with public justice, there
will necessarily be variations in the extent to which privacy is secured. We cannot forecast what the amount of
the protection will be tomorrow. We can only rest secure
in the knowledge that our interests are in competent and
careful hands.
211 Holmes, "The Path of the Law," COLLEMD LEGAL PAPERS, p. 180.
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